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“What we call the beginning is often the end 
And to make an end is to make a beginning. 
The end is where we start from.” 
 
T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding” 
 
The long road to corporate mobility in the EU has been a path full of ups and downs 
and turnarounds. Monotony has not been a characteristic of the evolution of freedom of 
establishment, since “even in a Single Market without borders, there may remain some 
hidden barriers to companies’ legal mobility”
1
 that should be tackled. After the ECJ’s 
recognition of corporate mobility in the EU, the barriers became more subtle and 
procedural. EU’s national legislations could not prevent the inbound or outbound 
companies’ migration, but they can make it very bureaucratic and disparate, in a way 
they hamper those migration movements.  Therefore, the need of a discipline for cross-
border mobility in the EU is the ‘end from where we should start’.  
Freedom of establishment is laid down in articles 49-54 TFEU,  referring article 49 
to the elimination of the restrictions on freedom of primary and secondary establishment 
(first paragraph) and to the right of pursuing activities as self-employed under the same 
conditions as the nationals of the Member State of establishment (second paragraph). 
Article 54 TFEU states that companies should be treated in the same way as natural 
persons, which is extremely difficult because “[g]ranting freedom of establishment to 
legal foreign persons is likely to have a heavier impact on a legal order than welcoming 
natural foreign persons”
2
. For that reason and also due to the lack of harmonization in 
EU company law, companies are treated differently within the EU, which may originate 
discrimination and threaten their cross-border mobility. 
 ECJ’s striking case law has been fighting against the obstacles created by Member 
States to corporate mobility and developing and interpreting the Treaty, once the Treaty 
provisions are not self-explanatory and unequivocal. The Court has been called to the 
‘battle field’ whenever a national legislation clashes with the corporate mobility 
                                                          
1 PELLÉ, Philippe, “Companies crossing borders within Europe”, 2008, Utrecht Law Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1 
(March), p. 6 
2 RAMMELOO, Stephan, “Corporations in Private International Law. A European Perspective”, 2001, Oxford 
University Press, p. 4 
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enshrined in the Treaty. The Court’s approach has been evolving naturally in a non-
linear way. To understand better the Court’s route three different chronological 
moments can be pointed out
3
.  
 In the first moment, the Court was reluctant and uncomfortable with its position. 
Here, in a landmark decision in Daily Mail case by avoiding the posed questions, it 
established the immunity of the conflict rules. In the second moment, the Court changed 
drastically its approach and we can find a more confident ECJ that “opened the gates for 
regulatory competition of company law”
4
, through cases like Centros, Überseering, 
Inspire Art and SEVIC Systems. In the third moment, it seems that the Court finally 
found the courage to be coherent and in Cartesio, National Grid Indus and VALE cases, 
it recognized bluntly the companies’ cross-border mobility.  
Thus, the Court’s case law has been a crucial tool on granting corporate mobility by 
forcing Member States to put their legislations in line with EU primary law.  However, 
“[e]ven a supranational court cannot be expected to take up the legislator’s tasks by 
providing versatile and detailed instruments in order to effectuate the total procedure of 
cross-border company transfers”
5
. The jurisprudential incentive has triggered several 
legislative solutions such as the SE Regulation and the CBMD that by allowing only 
indirectly the transfer of company’s seat are burdensome and clearly not designed to 
ensure the transfer of company’s seat in a ‘single step’. Furthermore, “despite the many 
company law directives which have been adopted, considerable differences in the way 
the various Member States regulate companies and their activities remain”
6
. For that 
reason a directive on transfer of company’s seat is needed to build a common 
framework that regulates the completely different regimes Member States may decide to 
adopt on this field, especially the very different levels of protection of the affected 
stakeholders Member States may request. 
Our argument is that it is time for the EU to ‘finish the job’ and to guarantee the 
proper functioning of cross-border mobility. The 14
th
 directive needs to be finally 
adopted, since “[p]roperly conducted company migrations can only be achieved on the 
basis of a harmonizing directive taking into account the multifold interests of many 
                                                          
3 PICHEL, Paulo, “O âmbito espacial do regime de coligação societária à luz do Direito da União Europeia”, 
2014, Direito das Sociedades em Revista, Ano 6, Vol. 11, p. 236-240 
4 CAHN, Andreas & DONALD, David C., “Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Laws Governing 
Corporations in Germany, the UK and the USA”, 2011, Cambridge University Press, p. 82 
5 RAMMELOO, Stephan, “Corporations…”, p. 315 
6 CRAIG, Paul & DE BÚRCA, Gráinne, “EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials”, 2011, 5th edition, Oxford 
University Press, p. 779-780 
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internal and external company ‘actors’ (shareholders, debenture holders and other 
company creditors, employees, national tax and social security law authority)”
7
. In 
short, each Member State will be responsible for legislating within the framework 
established by the 14
th
 directive that ensures that EU primary law is respected.  
As we will see in detail, we believe that the right time for the 14
th
 directive adoption 
has arrived, considering that: a) the classical ‘struggle’ between the two opposing 
conflict of laws (incorporation theory and real seat theory) is currently surpassed and it 
is settled that exists space for both theories in the EU as long as they follow the 
‘European detour’ (“desvio europeu”
8
) and as long as they are not against the principle 
of freedom of establishment; b) Court’s case law has evolved towards the recognition of 
the cross-border mobility in the EU and in the most recent case law it has also assumed 
the difficulties resulting from the lack of regulation on this area and suggested the need 
for further legislative action; c) the European regulatory competition requires a urgent 
discipline that ensures the protection of the affected ‘players’; d) the regulated indirect 
transfer of company’s seat does not substitute the need for regulating direct transfer of 
company’s seat; and e) consistent preparatory work has been done for the 14
th
 directive. 
Finally, in order to make our point easier to understand we organized our work in the 
following way: in chapter 2, we tried to answer the question “is the 14
th
 directive truly 
needed”. With the view to frame and answer the posed question the two existing 
theories of conflict of laws were confronted and ECJ case law was analyzed. In chapter 
3, we planned answering the question “why is the 14
th
 directive truly needed”.  The 
response emerged after considering the regulatory competition in the EU and also after 
challenging the current situation of indirect and direct transfer of company’s seat. Last 
but not least, in chapter 4, we attempted to answer the question “how should the 14th 
directive be designed”. The final question was responded through the analysis of the 
preparatory work that has been done so far for the 14
th
 directive and a proposed model 
for the 14
th
 directive was conceptualized.   
                                                          
7 RAMMELOO, Stephan, “Freedom of establishment: cross-border transfer of company ‘seat’ – The last piece of 
the puzzle?”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2012, p. 587-588 
8 CORDEIRO, António Menezes, “Direito das Sociedades”, 2011, Part I, 3rd edition, Almedina, p. 211 
10 
 
2. Is the 14th directive truly needed? 
 
a) Companies’ conflict of laws in the EU 
 
These days, we can find in the European scenario two major theories that give us the 
connecting factors to determine which law is applicable to companies, i.e., their lex 
societatis. They are the incorporation theory (siège statuaire) and the real seat theory 
(siège réel). 
Both, “the real seat theory and the incorporation theory consider that a company 
must be formed according to the law of the place where it is incorporated […] [but the 
first one] requires the centre of management and control of the company to be situated 
in the state of incorporation”
9
. This means briefly that the real seat theory tends to limit 
corporate mobility, which is the freedom granted to a company to operate and move to a 
different jurisdiction. The siège réel theory brings the underlying idea that companies 
are States’ propriety and they can only exist as such within the State where they were 
created, thus this theory asks for a real link between the company and the State that 
regulates its existence, so “reality gains over legal form”
10
; on the contrary the siège 
statuaire theory advocates that “besides a registered office (mainly for receipt of legal 
proceedings), no other connection with the country of incorporation is required: 




 Therefore, “the incorporation theory appears to be more business oriented, whereas 
the real seat theory appears to attribute more weight to other interests”
12
. We should 
mention that these other interests have hidden objectives that are clearly protectionists, 
but since those objectives have been gradually declared contrary to the EU freedoms, 
they have been transformed and replaced by another perspicacious argumentative 
                                                          
9 SOUSA, António Frada de, “Company’s Cross-border Transfer of Seat in the EU after Cartesio”, Jean Monnet 
Paper 07/09, p. 6 
10 WYMEERSCH, Eddy, “The Transfer of Company’s Seat in European Company Law”, 2003, ECGI Working 
Paper 08/2003, p. 9 
11 WYCKAERT, Marieke & JENNÉ, Filip, “Corporate Mobility”, 2010, SSRN, p. 5 
12 PASCHALIDIS, Paschalis, “Freedom of Establishment and Private International Law for Corporations" (2012) 
Oxford University Press, p. 29 
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The incorporation theory believes that companies are governed by the law of the 
country where the company was incorporated, even if the company has no activity in 
the incorporation country. According to this theory the legal order that creates the 
corporation should also govern it
14
. The state of incorporation is the one having more 
interest to regulate the company. 
Despite the fact that the incorporation theory has been usually associated with 
common law jurisdictions, it has recently attracted some civil law jurisdictions such the 
Netherlands and Switzerland due to its well-known capacity of attracting investment 
and promoting economic development. However, some typically incorporation states 
are: the United Kingdom and Ireland. This theory is based on private autonomy 
(private-law conception of company law) because it allows the choice of law to govern 
one company, simply by incorporating in the chosen country. Moreover, the 
incorporation states recognize in their jurisdictions the existence of foreign companies 
due to the case law rule and principle resulting from vested rights doctrine that 
“incorporation by one state will be recognized in every other state” and also due to 
international comity («comitas gentium»)
15
.  
As this theory accepts companies’ mobility and its foreign activity, the transfer of the 
center of administration and control does not represent an issue because wherever the 
company operates, it will always be subject to the law of its domicile of origin. Also, 
this theory allows the company’s shareholders to choose the best company regime, but 
“once this choice is made, it is maintained throughout the company’s life, irrespective 
of where its actual activities take place”
16
. Furthermore, as we mentioned above, when a 
company is validly incorporated in its home state, it will be recognized all over the 
place. 
But not everything is permitted under this theory, once the transfer of registered 
office is next to impossible. Doing an analogy, as natural entities cannot change their 
                                                          
13 SOUSA, António Frada de, “A Europeização do Direito Internacional Privado – os novos rumos na 
regulamentação das situações privadas transnacionais na UE”, May 2012, Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Católica 
Portuguesa (Porto), nt. 279, p. 100 
14
 DRUCKER, Thomas C., “Companies in Private International Law”, 1968, v. 17, ICLQ  
15 SOUSA, António Frada de, “A Europeização…”, p. 100 
16 PANAYI, Christiana HJI, “Corporate Mobility in Private International Law and European Community Law: 
Debunking Some Myths”, 2009, QMUL, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2009, p. 8 
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place of birth; these legal entities (companies) cannot change the country where they 
were born as well, which is represented by their registered office. Companies 
incorporated under this theory cannot transfer abroad their register offices, not even 
from England to Scotland. They get trapped to their State of incorporation. It is 
common to say that real seat theories are protectionist, but given this situation, aren’t 
incorporation theories ‘a little bit’ protectionist as well? 
One of the major concerns related to this theory is the so-called ‘letter/mail box 
companies’, which means the situation where a company incorporates in a State, 
without having any activity in that State and only incorporates there for the purpose of 
taking advantage of tax benefits or of a more “friendly” corporate regime. Being so, the 
incorporation theory may leave the door open for abuse of law. Attracting huge 
companies to incorporate on their jurisdiction just because their company law has laxer 
rules and less demanding corporate governance rules may be a negative consequence of 
the regulatory competition this theory enables and that may constitute abuse of law. The 
danger of this “race to the bottom” and ‘leakage’ of national companies that may be 




The real seat theory believes that companies are governed by the law of the country 
in which the company has its head office, meaning its center of management and control 
or its ‘brain’. This theory is intimately linked with civil law jurisdictions, having a few 
variations in each State’s approach. Some real seat States are: France, Germany, Italy 
and Portugal. Apart from each country’s specificities, this theory considers that each 
State has an absolute power over companies’ lives and it can only recognize what it has 
created. 
In France, where this theory was first received and developed, the chosen connecting 
factor is the “siège social” which can be determined by the following test: the siège 
social is “the place where the general assembly of shareholders is summoned, the board 
of directors has its offices, and the superior organs of management and control can be 
found”
18




                                                          
17 SOUSA, António Frada de, “A Europeização…”, p. 104-105 
18 PASCHALIDIS, Paschalis, op. cit., p. 8 
19 Id., p. 8- 9 
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In Germany, traditionally the country with the strictest approach of the theory, the 
real seat has been considered, by the case law, as the place where the company is run 
and managed and by ‘run and managed’, the case law means the place where the day-to-
day decisions of the company are taken, insofar as the German BGB does not clearly 
specify a choice of law and renvoi is crucial on determining the applicable law
20
. 
In Italy, a curious situation takes place, since the Italian law (article 25 of Law 218 of 
May 31, 1995) gives space to both theories by creating in the same article two different 
rules: the first, which is bilateral, applies the law of the place of incorporation (legge 
dello Stato nel cui territorio è stato perfezionato il procedimento di costutuzione) and 
the second, which is unilateral, applies the Italian law if the place of administration or of 
the company’s main business is located in Italy (legge italiana se la sede 
dell’amministrazione è situate in Italia, ovvero se in Italia se trova l’oggetto 
principale)
21
. This principle of “two rules in one” was adopted in order to apply the 
Italian law to companies operating in Italy and, above all, to prevent the abuse of law 
perpetrated by the foreign companies Anstalten, which are autonomous funds with legal 
personality from Liechtenstein, created by Italians to exclusively operate in Italy.  
In Portugal, the law establishes a twofold criterion (article 3 of the Portuguese 
Companies Code): for internal relationships (between parties of the company) the 
criterion to be applied is the real seat as the place of the main and effective seat of 
administration (sede principal e efectiva da administração) and for external 
relationships (with “true” third parties) the chosen criterion is the statutory seat as the 
place referred to in the company’s statutes when this is Portugal (a sociedade que tenha 
em Portugal a sede estatutária não pode, contudo, opor a terceiros a sua sujeição a lei 
diferente da lei portuguesa)
22
. 
As we mentioned above, the real seat States require the centre of management and 
control of a company to be located in the state of incorporation, which restricts 
companies’ freedom of movement. This theory in pure terms sends the message that 
States should control everything that happens in their territory because there are truly 
linked to that, and that allow us to infer that the real seat is a protectionist theory that 
does not accept companies operating in one country under the jurisdiction of another 
                                                          
20 PASCHALIDIS, Paschalis, op. cit, p. 10 
21 BAREL, Bruno & ARMELLINI, Stefano, “Manuale Breve Diritto Internazionale Privato”, 6th ed., Giuffrè, 
Milan, 2011, p.128-129 
22 ABREU, Jorge M. Coutinho de (Coord.), “Código das Sociedades Comerciais em Comentário”, Vol. I,  
Reprint, Almedina, Coimbra, 2010, p.74-75 
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(public-law conception of company law). Therefore, corporate mobility is hard to 
achieve under this theory, because generally if companies want to transfer their center 
of management and control, they have, to liquidate in the country of origin and open ex 
novo in the other country, which is not conceptualized as transfer of seat. If they do not 
do so and simply start operating in another Member State then the company will not be 
considered as a company in real seat state, but for instance as a general partnership in 
case of Germany, being its shareholders considered personally liable for the company’s 
debts and not having the company the necessary legal capacity to sue
23
. 
These theories come from opposite assumptions and the interesting fact has been in 
the past years how to coordinate them with the corporate mobility envisaged by the EU 
law. If interpreted in strict terms both theories can originate problematic situations, 
especially when a company wants to move its real seat from an incorporation State to a 
real seat State which may lead to a double nationality situation (“bipatride” 
companies
24
) or conversely from real seat State to an incorporation State which may 
lead to a stateless situation
25
.  
For many years the academic debate was focused on the choice of the ‘best’ system 
of conflict of laws for the EU. Nowadays we are aware that a European choice between 
them will probably never be made because it is not needed. The ECJ through its case 
law “acknowledged that the choice between the connecting factors remains also within 
the member state’s sovereignty”
26
 and that there is space for both theories in the EU as 
long as they comply with the principle of freedom of establishment. As a consequence 
both theories have to be mitigated in its pure terms and they have to allow corporate 
mobility.  
In a nutshell, the incorporation theory allows the transfer of the center of 
management and control, but it does not allow the transfer of the registered office, so it 
is a restrictive theory; nevertheless the real seat theory does not allow the transfer of the 
center of management and control, nor the transfer of the registered office to and from 
another Member State, which means it is a very restrictive theory, that by nature 
prevents company’s mobility. However, both theories have been changed by the Court’s 
                                                          
23 PANAYI, Christiana HJI, op.cit., p. 10 
24 WYMEERSCH, Eddy, op.cit., p. 13 
25 WYCKAERT, Marieke & JENNÉ, Filip, op.cit., p. 7-8 
26 DEÁK, Daniel, “Cartesio: A Step Forward in Interpreting the EC Freedom of Emigrate”, 2009, Tax Notes 
International, Vol, 54, Number 6, p. 499 
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case law being no longer considered the ‘issue’ on what concerns corporate mobility, as 
we will see.  
 
b)  ECJ’s case-law: an odyssey towards the 14th directive? 
 
The ECJ case law will be analyzed first, in chronological order to allow the 
understanding of the cases’ context and afterwards, in connection with the cases that 
should be read together to enable a deeper and more systematic analysis. 
The cycle began with Daily Mail case
27
, a tax-law case between an UK company 
named Daily Mail and General Trust PLC (“Daily Mail”) that wanted to transfer its tax 
residence to the Netherlands in order to have a better tax regime. At the same time, it 
wanted to maintain its UK company status and to continue to be subject to the UK 
company law. The UK Treasury did not give the required permission to do so, without 
Daily Mail paying accumulated tax in the UK. Despite the fact this case was exclusively 
related with exit taxes, the Court saw knowingly a case of clash of conflict laws in 
company law and decided to answer to another question instead of the posed question. 
The posed question was whether this UK Treasury right to refuse the transfer without 
paying accumulated tax in the UK was compatible with the Treaty’s freedoms. The 
Court did not answer to the posed question, but to a question related to the compatibility 
of the real seat theory with the Treaty and consequently the possibility of transferring a 
company’s central administration to another State, while keeping the company subject 
to the law of the country of origin. The fact was that the Court felt the need to announce 
the compatibility between the real seat theory and the Treaty and the need to declare 
that the non-posed question was outside the scope of application of the Treaty. 
Conversely it was within the exclusive scope of action of the Member States that should 
enter into conventions or harmonize the issue through further legislation.  
This decision hides a dangerous carte blanche to real seat States “to ‘kill their 
companies at the border’ whenever those companies decided to transfer their seat 
abroad”
28
. In addition, the Daily Mail case enacted the so-called preliminary matter 
theory, which is translated into the principle that “unlike natural persons, companies are 
creatures of the law and, in the present state of Community law, creatures of national 
                                                          
27 ECJ Case  81/87, 27 September 1988 





, and so national legislations have the power of life and of death over companies. 
The reasoning of the case was based on the argument “a maiori, ad minus”, meaning 
that if a Member State could kill its companies at the border whenever they want to 
emigrate; then a Member State could also refuse the transfer of a company’s tax 
residence to another Member State
30
. 
 Although far from the best decision in terms of reasoning, it is only acceptable due 
to its own historical context. We come to the conclusion that the Court had an agenda 
on the Daily Mail decision related to the dichotomy between the two theories and, to 
comply with that agenda, it reframed the posed question in order to answer to what it 
intended. The Court could have waited and chosen another case to fulfill its agenda. As 
a consequence of this judgment, the ECJ left a burdensome legacy to corporate 
mobility.  
 
The story goes on with the “trilogy Centros/ Überseering/ Inspire Art”
31
 that ensured 
the regulatory competition in companies to be incorporated and that drew boundaries for 
the real seat theory in order to reconcile it with the freedom of establishment. 
 Centros case
32
, where two Danes were denied the right of opening a branch in 
Denmark of a company they had created in UK to avoid the stricter Danish company 
law. Here, the Court cleverly invoking the right of secondary establishment conferred 
by the Treaty, decided that Member States could not discriminate companies 
incorporated outside their territory and those companies should be recognized as 
existing under the law of State of incorporation, even if they carry all the activity in the 
State of their secondary establishment. Conclusion: founding shareholders of a company 
can choose the most attractive company law to set up the company, which means the 
ECJ through this decision “sponsors” regulatory competition as a desirable route for the 
EU. It was raised the question whether abuse of law was implied in this case, but the 
Court dismissed it, considering that this situation represents a legitimate exercise of 
freedom of establishment.  
                                                          
29 Paragraph 19 of Daily Mail case 
30 SOUSA, António Frada de, “A Europeização…”, p. 356 
31 Expression used by SOUSA, António Frada de, and also, among others, by HOPT, Klaus J., WALZ, W. 
Rainer, VON HIPPEL, Thomas & THEN, Volker, “The European Foundation: A New Legal Approach”, 2006, 
Cambridge, p. 190 et seq. and MICHAELS, R., “EU Law as Private International Law? Re-conceptualising the 
Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory”, 2006, Duke Law, p. 10 et seq. 
32 ECJ Case C-212/97, 9 March  1999 
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Followed by Überseering case
33
, where a limited liability company incorporated in 
the Netherlands intended to transfer its center of administration to Germany, where the 
directors lived. Germany refused to recognize legal and judiciary capacity to the 
company and as a consequence the company could not stay in legal proceedings. The 
Court decided that when a company is incorporated under the laws of a Member State 
and exercises its freedom of establishment in another Member State, the host Member 
State has to recognize the company’s legal capacity. This judgment announced the end 
of the Sitztheorie as it was built in Germany until then and from here on Germany began 
to mitigate its real seat theory. 
Inspire Art case
34
 concerns a company incorporated in the UK that only operated in 
the Netherlands and that wanted to open a branch there. Under Dutch law, since this 
company only operates in the Netherlands it had to specifically mention its foreign 
status in the registry and it had to comply with Dutch company law. The Court stated 
that Dutch rules that subjecting pseudo-foreign companies to Dutch company law were 
inadmissible because a foreign company should be respected as such, i.e. as a company 
subject to another State’s law.  
After this trilogy we can conclude that from then on Member States have to 
recognize the legal capacity of a foreign company operating in their jurisdiction and 
also that they have to recognize the foreign company as a company incorporated and 
subjected to another Member State’s jurisdiction. Even though many scholars believe 
the ECJ chose, in the trilogy judgments, the incorporation theory as the most suitable 
theory for the EU, the fact is that for protecting and granting the freedom of 
establishment, the ECJ without going directly against the real seat theory and always 
keeping its neutrality, ended up undermining the position and utility of the real seat 
theory. On the one hand, the company should not change its applicable law if the 
Member State of incorporation allows the company to remain subject to its jurisdiction 
after having transferred its real seat to another Member State. On the other hand, if the 
Member State of incorporation does not allow the company to remain subject to its 




                                                          
33 ECJ Case C-208/00, 5 November 2002 
34 ECJ Case C-167/01, 30 September 2003 
35 SOUSA, António Frada de, “A Europeização…”, p. 630 
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As a consequence of these three last decisions, although being compatible with the 
Treaty, the real seat theory started dying from the inside for not being a good player on 
the regulatory competition match. Given that regulatory competition is a reality in the 
EU, as we will see, the real seat theory by not allowing the companies incorporated in 
their jurisdiction to play in another Member States while remaining subject to the home 
State law are limiting their national companies’ field of action. At this stage, the choice 
of a conflict rule or of the nuances to give to the chosen conflict rule is a question of 
strategy and of knowing how to play the game. 
 In the trilogy decisions, the line followed by the Court was inspired by the “juridical 
pragmatism”, which is a consequentialist approach that focuses on the practical results 
the Court wants to achieve, that is ensuring the freedom of establishment and an 
efficient EU company law based on regulatory competition
36
. Due to this “result-
oriented” methodology followed by the ECJ, the concept of abuse of law appears with a 
minimized and almost ‘rhetorical’ importance, as mentioned by Sorensen, and as a 
vague idea of something that could be done by the States to avoid the abuse of law. It is 
difficult to precise the concrete measures that Member States could take to prevent the 
abuse of law and after Cadbury Schweppes case it became even more difficult, because 
by addressing the abuse of law on a different approach, those cases get hard to 
reconcile, as we will see. 
The SEVIC Systems Case
37
 refers to a merger between a German company and a 
Luxembourg company that was prevented because the German legislation only allowed 
mergers between German companies. The Court decided that this legislation was 
against the freedom of establishment, once cross-border operations “constitute particular 
methods of exercise of the freedom of establishment, important for the proper 
functioning of the internal market”
38
. Then, the ECJ admitted also that there was no 
justification for that German law because “such a rule goes beyond what is necessary to 
protect those interests”
39
, meaning the interests of creditors, minority shareholders and 
employees and protect fiscal supervisions and commercial transactions. In this decision, 
the Court rejected the “preliminary matter” approach of Daily Mail, brought by the 
German argument related to the extinction of the incorporated company during the 
                                                          
36 SOUSA, António Frada de, “A Europeização…”, p. 635-646 
37 ECJ Case C-411/03, 13 December 2005 
38 Paragraph 19 of SEVIC Systems Case 
39 Paragraph 30 of SEVIC Systems Case 
19 
 
process of the merger and consequent transfer of the former company’s assets to the 
incorporating company, becoming factually impossible to take advantage of the 
freedom of establishment. The ECJ dismissed the formalistic German reasoning, 
considered as “an inverted logic” by AG Tizzano, and adopted a literal and broad 
interpretation of the scope of freedom of establishment, that gives the same treatment to 
persons and companies in terms of freedom of establishment (as a result of the case De 
Lasteyrie du Saillant)
40
. Plus, the adopted interpretation was the opposite that was 
decided on Daily Mail and Cartesio, being the SEVIC’s interpretation the most updated 
that has been used in the last decades. Beyond that, this SEVIC’s broad interpretation 
represents the thorn in Cartesio’s side. 
One year later, in 2006, it was the time for Cadbury Schweppes case
41
, another tax 
law case. Cadbury Schweppes, a UK company created two subsidiaries in Ireland to 
benefit from a better tax regime and to avoid the UK legislation on ‘controlled foreign 
companies’ (CFCs). ECJ said that neither companies nor people should take advantage 
of the EU law. But the fact that a company has established subsidiaries in another 
Member State in order to benefit from a better tax regime it is not enough to be 
considered abuse. Moreover, it has concluded that the CFCs legislation wanted to 
prevent the exercise of freedom of establishment and it can only be justified in 
situations such as a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary and cannot go beyond what is 
necessary to avoid the circumvention of a national legislation. One of the most 
important aspects in this judgment is the interpretation given to “abuse of law” by the 
Court that goes against its previous interpretation argued in Centros and Inspire Art. In 
Cadbury Schweppes the Court readjusts its understanding of fraud/abuse of law by 
developing a test that whenever passed will allow Member States to adopt general 
measures (not case by case measures as established in previous decisions)
42
  to prevent 
abuse of law. The test consists in analyzing whether we are in the presence of “an 
artificial arrangement which has no real economic link with the host Member State” and 
does not “carry on genuine economic activities in the host Member State”
43
. If there is 
an effective participation in the host Member State that is objectively verifiable, then the 
Member State is not allowed to react against this company. 
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This more comprehensive interpretation of abusive practices should nowadays be 
applied to all legal areas, thus being considered as a general principle of EU Law. 
However as we have said above, the Court is imbued by the result-oriented perspective 
of juridical pragmatism and that is what makes possible to reconcile Centros/ Inspire 
Art with Cadbury Schweppes. The ECJ does not consider regulatory competition as a 
desirable route for tax law due to its characteristics based on redistributive purposes and  
it has a more demanding notion of abusive practices through Cadbury Schweppes to 
allow Member States to fight against the ‘artificial arrangements’. Differently, the Court 
considers regulatory competition desirable for company law and based on that belief 
developed the laxer standard present in Centros and Inspire Art jurisprudence that 
represents a conditio sine qua non together with the mutual recognition principle to 
enable regulatory arbitrage for companies in the EU
44
. This double standard approach of 
abusive practices is justifiable within the juridical pragmatism methodology followed 
by the Court: for different consequences, different standards and solutions. 
In 2008, Cartesio case
45
 was decided and the decision was awaited with great 
enthusiasm for the revolution it could represent. Cartesio case occurred 20 years after 
Daily Mail and it emerged for testing the validity of Daily Mail in the current days. 
Those cases should be read together, since they refer to the same object (company’s 
emigration) and they follow the same approach (a divergent approach from the 
remaining case-law). 
 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt (“Cartesio”) is a Hungarian company that wanted 
to transfer its seat from Hungary to Italy and at the same time continue to be considered 
as a Hungarian company. The problem was that Hungarian law did not allow these 
situations of transferring companies’ seat abroad, while continuing to exist as a 
Hungarian company (in reality, continuing to exist as a company). The Court was asked 
whether Hungarian law was incompatible with EU law. The way the Court answered 
the posed questions (that were reframed) is by addressing the preliminary matter and 
consequently repeating the idea affirmed in Daily Mail that the transfer of a company’s 
registered office or head office from one Member State to another Member State is not 
related with freedom of establishment and Treaty provisions, but it should be regulated 
by national laws and conventions. So, Member States are free to prevent companies 
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governed by their national law to transfer their seat abroad. This decision is in line with 
Daily Mail, because the Court was not able or did not want to see the differences 
between the cases, even if two decades have passed since the first decision and the case-
law has evolved. 
 However, Cartesio made some progress from Daily Mail in the sense of improving 
the ‘preliminary matter theory’ through an obiter dictum, where the Court granted to 
companies the possibility of direct reincorporation, which means the transfer of 
companies’ registered offices to another Member State, without losing their legal 
personality and changing their applicable law. The obiter dictum was the upgrade 
brought by Cartesio that made finally possible for the companies to avoid being “killed 
at the border” whenever they want to reincorporate in another Member State. The ECJ 
ensured that Member States do neither have “immunity”, nor total freedom to forbid a 
cross-border transfer of a company
46
, but they should create the necessary measures to 
allow direct reincorporation to occur. Since Cartesio, the lack of an appropriate 
legislative instrument does not allow Member States to hinder direct reincorporations, 
even though they may be difficult to put into action
47
. 
 Nevertheless, in the overall Cartesio was one step back on the walk to limit Member 
States complete freedom to “kill” their companies, whenever they want to move abroad. 
The decision had not met the expectations, especially after the Opinion of the AG 
Poiares Maduro that gave a much better reasoning to achieve the same outcome: general 
public interest invoked in the justifications level. The Court, after having clarified in 
previous judgments that inbound and outbound situations may be treated differently and 
that the model for outbound situations was Daily Mail, remained attached to the heavy 
and implicit burden of having to follow its previous case-law. Lack of courage to direct 
overrule or tremendous respect for the precedent, the fact is that the Court did not want 
to solve the case following SEVIC’s broad interpretation of the right of establishment. 
Conversely, it decided to circumvent and avoid SEVIC like it were a stranger and to 
return the previous formalistic and conservative approach. 
However, this judgment sends a clear message to real seat States: they have to “allow 
their companies, at least to be capable of transferring their seat abroad with a change of 
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The trilogy “Centros/ Überseering/ Inspire Art” granted companies’ freedom of 
entering into another State, meaning that the Court had gradually affirmed the freedom 
of immigration for companies and Member States are obliged to accept and recognize 
foreign companies operating in their territory. Regarding companies freedom to 
emigrate, things don’t work the same way. Cartesio missed the chance of granting a real 
and complete freedom of establishment in the EU and it perpetuated the different 
treatment given to the immigration and emigration of companies, making the outbound 
situation less protected than inbound situations. Nevertheless, after Cartesio it became 
clear that cross border transfer of company’s seat within the EU has to be regulated 
through a directive that harmonizes its procedures. Some authors pointed out that “[i]n 
light of the current ECJ case law, only a legislative approach would seem suitable to 





We should now focus on the most recent case law post-Cartesio to explore what has 
been changing in the Court’s approach. The National Grid Indus case
50
 is a tax law case 
that is the inverse of Daily Mail. Ten Member States have intervened on this case and 
the decision was much awaited by corporate and tax lawyers and scholars.   
National Grid Indus BV (“National Grid Indus”) was a Dutch company that was 
integrated in a group of companies (National Grid Transco Group), whose parent 
company was located in the UK. The parent company made group loan to National Grid 
Indus and that loan was never used for the purpose that has been granted (electricity 
project in Pakistan), being considered as a result that the Dutch company made 
unrealized currency profits regarding the abovementioned loan
51
. National Grid Indus 
decided then to transfer its center of effective management to the UK. After the transfer, 
National Grid Indus became resident in the UK due to the Netherlands-UK tax 
convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion 
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(“Convention”) and as a consequence of that, all the tax rights over the company were 
due to the UK. In this context, the Netherlands asked for a “final settlement tax” at the 
time of the company’s transfer: the liquidation of the company’s tax liabilities 
(unrealized capital gains). 
Three questions were then referred to the Court; the first question: if National Grid 
Indus could rely on article of 49 of TFEU against the Netherlands to challenge the 
imposed exit tax at the time of the company’s transfer of effective management to 
another Member State; the second question: if article 49 of the Treaty were considered 
applicable, then should the imposed “final settlement tax” be considered contrary to the 
Treaty or not, and finally, the third question: if the answer to the previous questions 
depends on fact that the “final settlement tax” relates to a (currency) profit gathered 
under the Dutch jurisdiction when that profit cannot be reflected in the UK under its tax 
system. 
A unique opportunity was given to the Court to reconsider its reasoning and main 
findings on Daily Mail and Cartesio cases. The Court could now prove to what extent it 
has developed the scope of companies’ freedom of establishment and its first proof of 
“maturity” was the decision that National Grid Indus may rely on article 49 of the 
Treaty to challenge the exit tax imposed by the Member State of origin. 
As it is common on ECJ’s case law to mention previous cases, this decision referred 
Cartesio and Überseering
52
 cases to make a point: national legislations have to comply 
with the Treaty rules on freedom of establishment. Following its reasoning the Court 
assumed that there is a difference of treatment between a Dutch company wanting to 
transfer its seat abroad and a Dutch company retaining its seat in the Netherlands and 
that this “the difference of treatment relating to the taxation of capital gains is liable to 
deter a company incorporated under Netherlands law from transferring its place of 
management to another Member State”
53
. Next, the ECJ concluded this difference of 
treatment constitutes a restriction on the freedom of establishment that in principle is 
against the Treaty. The next logical step after admitting that this Dutch tax measure is a 
restriction is to look for a justification that allows this restriction of freedom of 
establishment to exist. Furthermore, the restrictive measure, if justifiable, may only 
exist to the necessary extent to preserve the interest it protects. The ECJ decided that 
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there was a valid justification for this restriction: the protection of the allocation of 
powers of taxation between the Member States, which means that unrealized capital 
gains should be taxed in the country where they arose
54
.  
Then, the Court analyzed whether the definitive establishment of the amount of tax 
should be done at the time when the company transfers its seat of management abroad 
and concluded that the Treaty does not prevent legislation of a Member State to fix 
definitively the amount of tax on unrealized capital gains relating to company’s assets at 
the time the company ceases to obtain taxable profits on that Member State due to a 
transfer of its seat to another Member State.  The ECJ examined if the Dutch legislation 
went beyond what was needed to reach its valid objective (proportionality analysis), 
taking into account two factors: the establishment of the amount of tax, described above 
and the recovery of that tax. On this analysis the decision was that “only the 
determination of the amount of tax at the time of the transfer […], and not the 
immediate recovery of the tax, should be regarded as not going beyond what is 
necessary for achieving that objective”
55
, therefore the Dutch legislation was 
disproportionate. One thing is to determine the due amount at the time the transfer takes 
place; we can understand this situation, once it is proportionate that a Member State acts 
before its power of taxation regarding the company cease to exist
56
; another different 
thing to ask for that amount to be paid at the exact same time of its determination. As 
mentioned by the AG Kokott in her Opinion, the economic situation of a company 
transferring its seat abroad may be so complex that forcing that company to pay the due 
tax amount on the moment it crosses the border might be a too heavy burden to be 
endured by this company
57
. 
 In sum, the Court, in this decision considered for some authors as a “Solomon’s 
verdict”
58
, concluded that article 49 of the TFEU must be interpreted as not precluding 
national exit tax rules that fix the amount of tax definitively, without taking into account 
decreases or increases in value that may occur after the date of transfer of the place of 
effective management. Furthermore, the Court held that article 49 of the TFEU 
precludes national exit tax rules that ask for the immediate recovery of tax on unrealized 
gains of a company when it transfers its place of effective management to another 
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Member State. This decision has merit for having been able to decide without focusing 
on the “quarrel” of the connecting factors, but on the role of the exit taxes within the 
freedom of establishment, contrary to what happen in Daily Mail. 
At this point, the million dollar question is what about Daily Mail after this judgment 
and how to reconcile this case with National Grid Indus. Both cases are very similar, 
but their outcomes are very different. For Daily Mail, the concept of freedom of 
establishment did not include per se, the right for a “company incorporated under the 
legislation of a Member State and having its registered office there to transfer its central 
management and control to another Member State”
59
; while, for National Grid Indus, 
the transfer of a company’s central management and control falls within the scope of 
freedom of establishment and it does not affect the company’s status on the 
incorporation country, nor affects the company’s possibility of relying on the Treaty
60
.  
Besides, the Achilles heel of National Grid Indus is the fiscal discrimination it 
creates between incorporation systems and real seat systems. In the end, this “quarrel” is 
back to ECJ stage, but in a more sophisticated and blurred way that in Daily Mail. The 
issue that was pointed out by several intervening Member States and was ignored by the 
Court is that if a real seat State has the power to ask an emigrating company to be 
liquidated and as a consequence to pay all its fiscal obligations, then it should mean that 
an Incorporation State should have the power to impose fiscal requirements (paragraph 
29 of National Grid Indus). “Prohibiting incorporation system states to apply exit 
taxation would fiscally punish these states for not trying to kill companies which 
attempt to make use of their free movement rights, as real seat states do”
61
. The 
Netherlands could have affected the company’s status as a Dutch company after the 
emigration, once it has not done so; the consequence is to “lose” the right to impose exit 
taxation over the company, once it is protected by the Treaty. It seems that on Daily 
Mail the approach was rather different, that the emigrating company could not rely on 
the Treaty for the transfer of its central management and control. Thus, we can “infer 
that either Daily Mail has become obsolete, or it has never contained the answer to the 
question the referring UK court had asked”
62
.  
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 National Grid Indus closed the circle and created a distinction
63
 where “corporate 
exit taxes applied in those Member States that adhere to the internal market-friendly 
incorporation theory can be scrutinized under the freedom of establishment whereas 
corporate exit taxes applied in those Member States that adhere to the internal market-
unsympathetic real seat cannot”
64
. We believe that the same regime should be applied to 
the real seat States; otherwise the incorporation States have an incentive to become less 
market-friendly and to adopt some typical real seat measures. It seems that when it 
comes to exit taxation cases, the ECJ feels the need to protect and comfort the real seat 
theory; unlike it does on cases regarding company law. This probably means that the 
ECJ agenda is pro-real seat theory on tax law issues and pro-incorporation theory on 
company law issues.  
In conclusion, “the Netherlands incorporation regime, according to which a 
company’s real seat can be transferred to another country while retaining its legal 
personality under Netherlands law, prevents Daily Mail from being used successfully 
according to the ECJ in National Grid Indus”
65
. 
Moreover, in terms of approach, the exit taxation of emigrating companies has been 
addressed by two perspectives of case law: the first, the previous case law on 
companies’ emigration, where the Court was questioned about the conditions of the 
freedom to emigrate and the second, the case law on exit taxation imposed on 
individuals
66
.  Regarding the first perspective, we can realize there is a different 
approach to corporate law cases and tax law cases, being “the freedom of establishment 
even in tax cases, still, partly dependen[t] on the adoption of the company law 
connecting factor by each Member State”
67
. In relation to the second perspective, case 
law on exit taxation imposed on individuals has determined that “immediate exit taxes 
were incompatible with the EU law”
68
; however the approach given for individuals exit 
taxation cannot be transposed to corporate exit taxation due to the different level of 
complexity in question.  
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After National Grid Indus decision, the Netherlands had to change its exit taxes 
regime and put it in accordance with the Court’s decision. The UK was asked by the 
Commission to amend its exit tax regime and others countries adapted their legislations 
like for instance Italy. 
This judgment represents one step forward in the development of the real concept of 
freedom of establishment, once it had reinforced the scope of the Treaty provisions and 
clarified some unclear aspects such as exit taxes in the EU. Beyond that, this decision 
stressed a crucial idea: despite the fact the Treaty ensures cross-border transfer of place 
of management, it does not ensure that it “will be neutral as regards taxation”
69
, since 
freedom of establishment does not ask for the Member States to make their national tax 
law depend on tax rules from other Member States, so as to remove any burden arisen 
from different tax rules. 
Finally, the National Grid Indus decision has influenced other decisions since it had 
created a framework to deal with other exit taxes cases, such as “in Commission v. 
Portugal, the ECJ extended its conclusions to a transfer of assets of a permanent 




The latest judgment regarding corporate mobility is VALE Case
71
 that represents a 
milestone in the EU freedom of establishment of companies, once it covers for the first 
time a cross-border conversion. This case should be read together with Cartesio, once 
VALE and Cartesio are two sides of the same coin.  
Cartesio ruled that a Member State may prevent their companies to transfer their real 
seat without changing the applicable law, a contrario sensu, if a company wants to 
transfer its real seat and jointly change its applicable law by converting into a host 
Member State’s company, then, in principle, the Member States could not prevent that 
to happen. This is the case of VALE. 
Regarding the facts, VALE Costruzioni Srl (“VALE Costruzioni”) was an Italian 
company that wanted to be converted into a Hungarian company named VALE Építési 
kft (“VALE Építési”). The Italian law allows cross-border conversions, but the 
Hungarian law only accepts domestic companies’ conversion. When registering the 
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company in Hungary, it was mentioned that VALE Costruzioni was VALE Építési’s 
“predecessor in law”, which did not permit the registration. The rejection of the 
application for registration was then addressed to the Hungarian courts that asked the 
ECJ to answer several questions, such as: whether this situation fall within the scope of 
article 49 and 54 of the Treaty; if it does so, in which sense must the Treaty be 
interpreted; the compatibility of the justifications presented with the Treaty; and if a 
distinction should be made between international and domestic conversions. 
The Court demonstrated a very strategic reasoning and started by mentioning that 
“company transformation operations are, in principle, amongst those economic 
activities in respect of which Member States are required to comply with the freedom of 
establishment”
72
 and that since national law only allows national companies to convert 
it falls within the scope of articles 49 and 54 of the Treaty.  
Then, the Court decided that the Hungarian legislation in this matter was restrictive 
to freedom of establishment, once “that legislation treats companies differently 
according to whether the conversion is domestic or of cross-border nature”
73
. This 
restriction can only be justified on the basis of overriding reasons in the public interest 
(interests of creditors, minority shareholders and employees, effective fiscal supervision 
and fair commercial transactions). Besides, the inexistence of EU law on this matter is 
not a justification for the different treatment given to international conversions. The fact 
is that Hungarian law “simply prohibite[s] cross-border conversions”
74
 always, without 
taking into consideration if the public interest is being threatened or not, so the Court 
declared that once there is no justification for this reality, the Hungarian law is contrary 
to the Treaty.  
When dealing with international conversions two national legislations are applicable, 
so these two legislations should be in line with the Treaty provisions. Therefore, 
Member States that allow national conversions must also grant the same right to 
international conversions.  
The Court draws the attention to the fact that when there is no EU law to regulate a 
specific matter, procedural rules having the shape of principles were developed to 
ensure that the Treaty is protected. Those principles are the principle of equivalence, 
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which means that national procedural rules created to ensure the protection of rights 
acquired under EU law should be governed by each Member State domestic law, 
provided that they are not less favorable than those governing similar domestic 
situations and principle of effectiveness, which means that such procedural rules should 
not “render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by the European Union legal order”
75
.  
In the end, the ECJ concluded that it is up for the host Member State to determine the 
applicable national law to cross-border conversions, but the abovementioned principles 
“preclude the host Member State from refusing, in relation to cross-border conversions, 
to record the company which has applied to convert as the ‘predecessor in law’, if such 
a record is made of the predecessor company in the commercial register for domestic 
conversions, and refusing to take due account, when examining a company’s application 




 Despite the fact that the Court has already used these principles to solve other 
matters such as the right to recover undue payments
77
, their introduction in this 
reasoning about cross-border conversion was innovative because it allowed to finally 
clarify what Member States should do and on what they should rely (host Member State 
legislation), additionally the Court “went further and offered its guidance on the 
procedural matters applicable to a cross-border conversion”
78
. 
 However, criticisms have been pointed out as the “principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness, for lack of supporting secondary legislation, are extremely vague. One 
might even ask whether they solve the question how cross-border conversion can take 
place or create further issues and uncertainties in this area”
79
. This fear of uncertainty is 
caused by situations where companies have to comply with both national laws and they 
are hard or impossible to reconcile or even, situations where a company no longer exists 
in the home Member State and still does not exist in the host Member State
80
.  
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The reason why the Court brought these principles to the decision was that, on the 
one hand it ruled the right to cross-border conversion under article 49 of TFEU and on 
the other hand it was aware that due to the absence of secondary EU law on this matter, 
companies will have to rely exclusively on Member States national law, which is risky; 
so, these principles appear to be a solution for controlling Member States national laws 
and ensuring they comply with the Treaty. This approach sends a clear message to 
Member States: even though no EU secondary legislation exists and the specific shapes 
of national legislations regarding freedom of establishment are not regulated, Member 
States national laws have to comply with EU law in the way it is interpreted
81
.  
We believe the ‘principles solution’ was a ‘last resort solution’ developed by the 
Court to calm the chaos resulting of twenty-seven national legislative standards, while 
the 14
th
 directive does not progress. 
On VALE case it is ruled that “the concept of establishment within the meaning of the 
Treaty provisions on the freedom of establishment involves the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in the host Member State for an 
indefinite period”
82
, where is inferred that companies can only have freedom of 
establishment if they pursue economic activity on the host Member State. This idea per 
se does not mean that the seat of management has be transferred together with the 
registered office, because the Court did not specify the “level of economic activity 
required”
83
, so if transferring the center of administration together with the registered 
office to a Member State would mean economic activity is being pursued in that 
country, the fact is that economic activity can be pursued even without the center of 
administration located in the same Member State. In addition, Member States may 
allow the transfer of the registered office alone; it is within their legislative freedom.  
VALE case will affect national legislations within the EU, once almost all European 
legislations do not allow cross-border conversions. As happened after SEVIC Systems 
case, when rules regarding cross-border mergers were introduced in national legislations 
like in Germany where a separate subsection was introduced in the German Code to 
cover cross-border mergers, the same thing is expected to happen regarding cross-
border conversions.  
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A curious fact about SEVIC Systems case is that short time after this judgment has 
been released, the CBMD was adopted. We believe VALE case has brought the required 
impetus for the 14
th
 Directive to be adopted.  
The VALE case may or may not be the end of a saga in the companies’ freedom of 
establishment, but one thing is certain this case brought to light the challenge that still 
remain to be fulfilled on corporate mobility and also, it has demonstrated that a  
consensus has been reached on the need for a directive. Since long time scholars have 
drawn the attention for the need of a directive, but in VALE the Court has agreed with 
the need of EU legislation on this issue
84
.  
If we read behind Court’s words in VALE, we note that it stresses that the needed 
directive must cover the sensitive aspects that could justify restrictions to freedom of 
establishment such as “protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders and 
employees, the preservation of the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the fairness of 
commercial transactions”
85
 in order to regulate national legislations. 
Further, the VALE case has not brought all the needed answers, in particular it “does 
not define the repercussions of a relocation of exclusively the company’s registration 
office (company headquarters remaining in the state of origin). Nor does it rule on a 
transfer of the company’s registered office and headquarters to different EU Member 
States, or on seat transfers operations involving non-EU/EEA territory […] [and] does 
not cover ‘crossover’ transfers simultaneously involving a change in the applicable law 
and a change in business form”
86
.  
In conclusion, after Cartesio and VALE, a Member State may not prevent a national 
company to move its registered office to another Member State (Cartesio) and may not 
prevent a foreign company to transfer its registered office to its territory by converting 
into a national company, if national conversions are allowed (VALE). What it may do is 
to set the terms of that transfer/conversation to its territory. Without a directive, each 
Member State is free to determine the procedure it considers necessary to allow 
conversions, which makes conversions more burdensome and complex. The 14
th
 
directive is needed to regulate this freedom Member States have and to establish a 
common general framework that, at the same time, facilitate reincorporations and 
protect the stakeholders involved.   
                                                          
84 See paragraph 38 of VALE Case 
85 Paragraph 39 of VALE Case 
86 RAMMELOO, Stephan, “Freedom of establishment…”, p. 588 
32 
 
3. Why is the 14th directive truly needed? 
 
a) Regulatory competition 
 
Firstly, in order to understand why is the 14
th
 directive truly needed it is important to 
highlight our conclusions so far. Since the dream of harmonizing substantial company 
law through a choice of conflict law for the EU has vanished and harmonization has 
proved not to be the right and the most desirable solution for EU company law, 
regulatory competition started to be seen as a valid choice for the EU. Plus, as we have 
seen above in the case-law analysis, the Court has declared and enabled the existence of 
companies’ mobility in the EU by fighting against the restrictions imposed by Member 
States to the exercise of the freedom of establishment. Even though Member States are 
ashamed of admitting, they have being adapting their domestic law to this new reality, 
maybe not directly to attract companies to their jurisdictions, but certainly to keep their 
legislation updated and to prevent the escape of their companies to other more 
interesting corporate regimes. Hereupon we have to admit that a “defensive” and ‘low 
profile’ regulatory competition already exists in the EU
87
.  
To recognize if regulatory competition is a reality or not in the EU we must 
understand what it means. The concept implies the idea of competition between States’ 
legislations to maintain or to attract more companies and so being to attract more 
investment. States compete to have their legislation with more “clients”, because if 
consumers of that legislation can chose to “buy” or not that legislation, they may all 
decide to “buy” another State’s jurisdiction. So each State has to stay attentive to what 
other States are doing in legislative terms in order to control the “attractiveness” of its 
own legislative system.  
This abovementioned idea of States as producers of law and nationals and companies 
as consumers of that law is the basis of regulatory competition that has been primarily 
developed by Charles Tiebout, that believed that if citizens were truly mobile, they 
would move to the municipality that best meets their needs and each municipality would 
provide a more efficient  public good provision  (“If consumer-voters are fully mobile, 
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the appropriate local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are 
adopted by the consumer-voters”
88
). 
By way of framing it, the term “regulatory competition” was originally used by the 
US scholarship, in the beginning of the twentieth century, when Delaware began to 
dominate the market by attracting more and more companies to incorporate there; 
occupying the position that used to belong to the state of New Jersey and that is why 
regulatory competition is also alternatively known as the “Delaware effect”
89
.  
Delaware effect may ring the bell of abuse of law, once companies may only 
incorporate there in order to take advantage of the more friendly company law existing 
in this State. Some may argue the fact that Delaware is the state for excellence for 
incorporating a company may be due to the effort put on implementing laxer laws in 
order to attract big companies, which may be called the “law beauty competition”
90
. 
However, states have been getting aware of the real danger of the abuse of law and 
“anti-abuse rules” have been enacted.  
When the Treaty foresaw mobility within the internal market, the Treaty was asking 
directly Member States to work together and to look at the neighbor’s yard to improve 
their own yard, in order to create a balanced European market. This means that, since 
the establishment of the internal market and the EU project, the old concept of a State 
“living alone” with its total sovereignty makes no sense, since the birth of the EU, 
Member States have to realized that they do not “live alone” anymore, they live in a 
“family home” and that implies several compromises in favor of the “EU family”. 
Those concessions include strategies and principles that need to be pursued by the all 
the Member States until a reasonable limit, that could justify restrictions. 
In the beginning Member States, in the inexperience and goodwill of the EU’s youth, 
believed that the best way to build this “family home” was by harmonizing company 
law. Altogether, giving up of their beloved national law in favor of a transnational law 
equal for all, that would bring attached a small part of each Member State. What a naïf 
dream, one may say today, as if it were that easy (and desirable) to achieve. Back then, 
regulatory competition was not considered a reasonable alternative to harmonization 
and, mostly, it was not conceived as a desired model to be adopted in EU. 
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  However, the winds changed due to the difficulties found on the implementation of 
the process of substantive harmonization and regulatory competition started to be 
considered as a valid alternative for Europe that would be more respectful of the 
principles of subsidiary and proportionality (article 5 (3) and (4) of TEU), based on the 
principle of mutual recognition and that could lead to an ex post harmonization by the 
market
91
. In fact, many scholars considered that “the future of European company law-
making would better be left with Member States than take the form of European 
legislation, except for areas in which a uniform consensus has emerged regarding the 
appropriate regulatory choice”
92
 and currently it is considered that “company law 
harmonization is, to put it mildly, uneasy”
93
.  
A new conception of company law as business law that requires flexibility and 
diversity enabling business to occur has reinforced the idea of regulatory competition as 
the right path for EU company law.  The previous idea of harmonization of EU law as 
the best solution to the EU project, started to be realized as a strategy developed by EU 
institutions with a hidden agenda to build a European identity and to consolidate a 
political unity in the single market
94
.  
In sum, regulatory competition seems to be the appropriate solution to guarantee and 
respect the European idiosyncrasies that are part of the EU DNA at the same time that 
allows the market to work on a more democratic basis. However, it is well-known that 
the market has several failures and if we allow company law to freely self-regulate, then 
stakeholders will suffer and be harmed by the shareholders’ choices of the best law 
applicable for the their companies. One may ask whether the harmonization is not the 
best option to protect stakeholders from shareholders unlimited power to choose their 
company law and consequently from their opportunism. Protecting stakeholders from 
the risks of regulatory competition through a mitigation and elimination of legislative 
diversity on company law is easiest way to “nip it in the bud”, but this does not mean 
that the easiest solution is the best one. On the contrary, regulatory competition is the 
best solution but requires a clear discipline to surpass its shortcomings and to guarantee 
the true corporate mobility in Europe. 
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Furthermore, attached to the abovementioned idea of regulatory competition is the 
idea of regulatory arbitrage that synthetically means that individuals and companies will 
choose the most favorable law to their specific situation and consequently they will take 
advantages of the different legislations offered by each Member State. In other words 
“legal arbitrage demonstrates a demand for legal rules that differ from existing law”
95
, 
which stimulates a more efficient legislation turned to the real needs of individuals and 
companies. In addition, for regulatory arbitrage to exist it requires that: first, mobility 
and mutual recognition are granted; second, different legislations are offered to 
individuals and companies that are aware of the different regimes; and finally it is 




The EU legislator has proven to be more and more in favor of the regulatory 
arbitrage rather than in favor of substantial harmonization, especially when adopted, 
first the SE Regulation, in 2004, that consequently originated different legal regimes in 
Member States to regulate this corporate entity, so leaving room for some regulatory 
competition and after, the CBMD, in 2005, which is closer to regulatory competition 
model than to substantial harmonization.  
Beyond the EU legislator, the Court also has shown some affection for regulatory 
competition in company law. Apart from guaranteeing the mobility enshrined in the 
Treaty, it has also helped changing the EU company law paradigm especially through 
cases like Centros, Cartesio and VALE, where “in terms of regulatory competition, 
Centros created a market for incorporations and Cartesio offered the prospect of a 
market for reincorporations”
97
, which after VALE became a market for conversions. 
Thus, the Court has made possible the cross-border mobility for companies in the EU, 
but it has not (and it could not) provide a full discipline to regulate that freedom. 
Currently, there is a lack of regulation in what concerns the freedom guaranteed by the 
Court. 
 Before Cartesio case, corporate mobility has been made possible through 
mechanisms created for other realities, originating a disparity in the treatment of two 
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variable of the same fundamental freedom
98
. In addition, it is important to mention that 
perhaps one of the reasons why dealing with the change of lex societatis in Europe has 
been so difficult is because the lex societatis in the EU covers more than the 
relationships between directors and shareholders; it covers also the relationships with 
creditors, which implies more collateral effects in case of cross-border mobility and 
greater consequences to stakeholders
99
. Being this one of the main reasons why 
reincorporations in EU need to be properly regulated. 
 
b) Indirect and direct transfer of company’s seat  
 
As we have mentioned previously, the indirect transfer of company’s seat in the EU 
is possible, since 2004, in an indirect way by the SE Regulation and, since 2005 by the 
CBMD. 
On the one hand, transfer a company’s seat using the SE Regulation is possible by 
transforming a company registered in a home Member State into a SE, then the SE can 
easily transfer its registered offices into another Member State and finally, once 
registered in the host Member State, it can transforms again into a public limited 
company
100
. This mechanism requires three stages instead of only one in order to permit 
the actual transfer of a company’s registered office. Plus, we should bear in mind that 
SE is a sui generis EU corporate entity, not a company duly established as a creature 
under national law of any EU Member State
101
. Moreover, apart from being a complex 
process, the SE does not allow the transfer of a company’s registered office, without the 
transfer of the company’s real seat/center of management and control together, which 
means the SE Regulation made a choice and adhered to the real seat theory, what 
hinders the regulatory competition. 
On the other hand, transferring a company’s seat using the CBMD is possible by 
creating a subsidiary in the host Member State and then merging the company of the 
home Member State with its subsidiary
102
. This other mechanism requires two stages to 
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permit a company changing its registered offices.  The CBMD, conversely to the SE 
Regulation, does not follow any system of conflict of laws, being neutral in terms of the 
applicable law to cross-border merger. If both the home and host Member State adopt 
the real seat theory, then it will ask for the real seat to come along with the registered 
office, on the contrary if the host Member State adopts the incorporation theory the 
company can only transfer its registered office without the real seat
103
.  
Although these indirect options exist, they are not real options, once they are too 
costly and bureaucratic and so they are unattractive for entrepreneurs that would rather 
prefer a one-step solution. Because these options in the end of the day allow transfer of 
a company’s seat, unfortunately, they have been used as a Commission’s political 
excuse for “doing nothing” in terms of adopting the 14
th
 directive. 
We are well aware that after the revolution brought by Cartesio case, the direct 
transfer of company’s seat is a reality and currently, Member States have to allow their 
companies to change their registered offices and consequently their applicable law, i.e., 
to allow their companies to directly reincorporate. The problem is that direct 
reincorporation is under the purview of the very different Member States national law. 
So, it is up for each Member State to adapt its domestic regime to the Cartesio ruling, 
protecting the involved stakeholders, as they deem necessary. As a result, Member 
States are imposing very different conditions to enable companies’ transfer of seat and 
also, very different rules to protect the stakeholders affected by these transfers. All those 
national differences create an atmosphere of uncertainty and discrimination and weaken 
the freedom of establishment hard-won. 
So, if cross-border transfer of companies’ seat is possible indirectly by the SE and 
the CBMD and directly by primary law, why do we need secondary law (the coveted 
directive)? First, because the indirect modalities of cross-border transfer of companies’ 
seat force the incorporation of a new company, which implies a step more than what is 
actually needed and so they are costly and burdensome; second, because regulating the 
direct modality would “constitute an added value”
104
 that would facilitate the freedom’s 
implementation, in practical terms, to an extent the ECJ was unable to do. 
In a word, “neither legal certainty nor efficiency can be achieved solely by the ‘direct 
effect’ of primary law […] [that] does not provide a comprehensive set of rules in order 
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to fill the gaps formed as a result of the inapplicability of national law”
105
. Given this 
scenario it is urgent to finally adopt the 14
th
 directive that should regulate the conditions 
of direct reincorporations. 
Truth to be told, we should all be wondering by now, why is that the EU has 
conceived the SE and the CBMD, regulating more complex systems of mobility and it 
was not capable of adopting a directive that regulates a much simpler reality like the 
transfer of registered offices? The typical a fortiori argument should be considered “a 
maiori ad minus”, which means that if the EU company law was able to disciplinate 
more complex forms of corporate mobility, then the EU company law must regulate and 
therefore facilitate (in the same way as it does for SE and cross-border merger, i.e. in a 
direct and unequivocal way) the exercise of company’s freedom of establishment by 
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4. How should the 14th directive be designed? 
 
a) The long way towards the 14th directive 
 
Since long time ago, several efforts have been made towards a directive on cross-
border transfer of companies’ registered office, however they were all, so far, 
inconclusive. That is why academics usually describe the route to the 14
th




In 1993, the KPMG European Business Center in Brussels carried out a study named 
“Study on Transfer of the Head Office of a Company from a Member State to Another”, 
where concluded that since it was not effective to allow both theories of conflict of laws 
to operate, one should be chosen and two different solutions were presented. Those 
solutions assumed a form of two alternative directives, the first would be a directive 
based on the incorporation theory and the second would be a directive based on the real 
seat theory
107
. However, the Commission never fought for these directives, perhaps 
because it was convinced that they were condemned to fail due to Member States lack 
of will to give up on their connecting factor. But, on 1997, the Commission decided to 
prepare a draft that even though it was never presented externally as a proposal, it was 
inspired by the 1993 proposals
108
. Despite the fact the proposal opted to keep the 
neutrality regarding the conflict of laws, it was important to keep the discussion going 
on the lack of freedom of establishment in the EU. 
But the story continues and as a good “suspense” movie it is full of turnarounds and 
unforeseen events, such as: on 2003 the Commission presented an Action Plan on 
“Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU” where 
the 14
th
 directive was included as a priority; on 2006 the EU Parliament recalled that 
“the transfer of a registered office is today either impossible or hindered by the 
requirements imposed at national level, that a directive in this area is crucial for 
freedom of establishment, and that the long-awaited Fourteenth Company Law 
Directive would fill a lacuna in the system of the internal market for companies”
109
.   
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On 2007 in its resolution the Parliament asked directly, for the first time, the 
Commission to elaborate a proposal on the needed directive
110
 ; but, on this exact same 
year (2007) after developing an impact assessment
111
, the Commission in the person of 
the European Commissioner Charlie McCreevy announced the lack of need of action in 
this area and that the Commission would not proceed with the proposal because 
companies are already able to transfer their registered offices through the SE and the 
CBMD and also, because ECJ’s case-law would resolve the matter soon enough 
(through the Cartesio case that was pending). 
Despite the fact the Commission has abandoned the 14
th
 directive on 2007, from then 
on many scholars have not accepted the Commission’s decision and have tirelessly 
drawn the attention to the need of some legislative measure to be taken regarding 
transfer of registered offices: “the justification the Commission provides for not 
submitting a proposal for a Directive on cross-border transfer of the registered office is 
not convincing. It is to be doubted, incidentally, whether the Commission can provide a 
thorough argument. In the absence of such justification […], the Commission should 




Not only scholars were attentive to that need, but also the Parliament was, since in 
2009 it presented a resolution where “a legislative proposal for a directive laying down 
measures for coordinating Member States national legislation in order to facilitate the 
cross-border transfer within the Community of the registered office”
113
 was requested. 
This resolution came together with several recommendations that besides updated were 
similar to the recommendations presented on 2004 in the context a Commission’s 
consultation paper.  
Since the resolution fell on deaf ears, in 2012, the Parliament presented another 
resolution with recommendations on a 14
th
 company law directive on the cross-border 
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transfer of company seats
114
, requesting the Commission to submit a proposal following 
the Parliament’s recommendations specified in the report’s annex.  
Notwithstanding, later in the same year the Commission decided to launch a 
consultation on the future of European company law and the results were 68% of the 
respondents supported the need for directive in order to facilitate cross-border transfer 
of company’s registered office
115
. However, in the end of 2012 in its Commission 
Communication: Action Plan, the Commission looked like it was not entirely convinced 
about the need for EU future legislative measures on the transfer of seat and stated that 
more data were needed to confirm it: “The Commission acknowledges the importance 
of this issue. However, it considers that any future initiative in this matter needs to be 
underpinned by robust economic data and a thorough assessment of a practical and 
genuine need for and use made of European rules on transfer of seat. […] Throughout 
2013, the Commission will conduct public and targeted consultations to update its 
impact assessment on a possible initiative on cross-border transfer of registered office. 




As so it was, in the beginning of 2013 (from January until March), the insatiable 
Commission launched the promised consultation on the cross-border transfers of 
registered offices of companies, having the results been revealed in last September on a 
feedback statement. It is curious to observe the Commission’s comment on the feedback 
statement’s overview about the small number of companies involved on the consultation 
“only 28 companies responded directly to the consultation providing a sample not 
entirely satisfactory when compared to the total amount of companies in the EU. The 
Commission is aware that such a relatively small feedback can be caused by many 
factors. However, it was precisely the reason why the consultation was important in 
obtaining data which otherwise is impossible or very difficult to collect”
 117
; first, the 
Commission should bear in mind that perhaps one of the main factors for such a small 
participation might be the respondents’ fatigue and also, that after so many 
consultations it is normal that the Commission starts to lose some of its credibility; 
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second, the above cited comment seems like the preparation of another excuse to avoid 
presenting a directive, in case the majority of the respondents support further legislative 
measures. As to the results, 43% of the respondents considered that recent ECJ case law 
did not provide an adequate solution for cross-border transfer of registered offices, 
against the 28% that answered positively.  
In short, after so many consultations, Parliament recommendations, academic papers, 
entrepreneurs’ pleas, implied messages from the ECJ in its latest cases (especially in 
VALE), will the Commission ask for even more data or will it finally have the courage 
to do what it should have been done a few years ago? 
 
b) The proposed model for the 14th directive 
 
The concept of corporate mobility has been refined by the Court that through striking 
decisions has recognized the companies’ right to incorporate and to reincorporate into 
another Member State and so, the right to convert into a ‘foreign’ company. However, 
the Court has only carved the principle, not the procedural rules for that principle to take 
place. It is up for the Member States through their national laws to give real shape to the 
principle of freedom of establishment.  
In what concerns the right to incorporate, the Court’s case-law has recognized the 
right for a company to choose a Member State to incorporate and apart from being 
subjected to the chosen Member State applicable law, the company can develop all its 
activity in another Member State. This means that creditors from the country where the 
company develops its activity are or should be informed a priori that they are dealing 
with a foreign company, having then the choice to ask for additional warranties or not to 
engage in a relationship with that company
118
. However, not all creditors are in the 
position to have that choice, so being forced to establish a relationship with the 
company. Nevertheless, it should be considered that those “unwilled” creditors have the 
same level of protection as if they were in a relationship with a national company, once 
besides the different national laws, they all grant equivalent protection.  
The problems arise in what regards the right to reincorporate because in this situation 
creditors engaged into a relation with the company assuming that the current company’s 
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lex societatis will be the one applicable, which changes after the company 
reincorporates into another Member State. The rules are changed in the middle of the 
game, which is unfair if stakeholders cannot react to that. Each Member State should 
guarantee that the stakeholders affected by reincorporations are protected through the 
enactment of domestic law that confers the adequate protective mechanisms. But the 
fact that each Member State adopts its own different mechanisms may lead to 
inconsistent and discriminatory situations, which can easily be avoided if the 14
th
 
directive is adopted and plays its regulatory role coordinating the current regulatory 
arbitrage on this matter. 
Throughout this paper we have been drawing the attention to the undeniable need to 
adopt the 14
th
 directive; now we should take a step forward and analyze broadly the 
model and the key factors of this directive. 
In the 2007 Commission’s Impact Assessment two approaches were designed for the 
directive, being the first one considered the “limited” or the “narrow” approach and the 
other the “extensive” or the “broad” approach. The first legislative approach is 
considered limited due to the fact that it only allows the transfer of registered offices to 
another Member State with the real seat together and the second legislative approach is 
considered extensive for allowing the transfer of the registered office together without 
the real seat to another Member State. This extensive approach with a safeguard 
measure related to the ‘absence of any economic activity in the host Member State’ 
should be the one chosen for the 14
th






 directive should respect the following principles: “the transfer should not 
affect the legal personality of the company; the transfer should not affect the contractual 
relationships of the company; the transfer should not imply that the main business 
activity also be transferred; and minority shareholders should be protected”
120
.  
We have mentioned above that the Court has implicitly stated on VALE case some 
essential concerns the future directive must address, namely those aspects that could 
justify restrictions to freedom of establishment such as “protection of the interests of 
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creditors, minority shareholders and employees, the preservation of the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision and the fairness of commercial transactions”
121
. Beyond that, the 
future directive should “offer a simplified procedure […] [that] could be modelled on 
the existing Directive on Cross-border Mergers”
122
. This option seems to be the best 
solution for the 14
th
 directive for several reasons, being the first one consensus. One of 
the most difficult elements to achieve in order to adopt a directive is consensus on its 
actual needed and on its content (“it took more than twenty years of negotiation before 
the EU legislature could obtain approval for the adoption of [the Cross-Border Mergers] 
Directive”
123
 ). Regarding the consensus on its actual need, we believe that despite the 
Commission’s stubborn skepticism, it was already achieved taking into consideration 
the latest consultations performed, the most recent academic papers and the 
Parliament’s resolutions. In relation to the consensus on the future directive’s content, it 
has been considered a good strategy to adapt the model of the CBMD, once it provides 




The comprehensive protection of stakeholders is present on the elaboration and 
publication of the common draft terms of the cross-border merger and on the necessary 
reports of the management body and of an independent expert and this should be 
transposed to the 14
th
 directive.  
It is crucial to enhance the protection given to the employees in the CBMD, inspired 
in the German co-determination regime, that through the mandatory rule of article 16 
confers, when applicable, to the employees the right of negotiation the regime to be 
applied after the transfer; furthermore, the CBMD leaves room for other additional 
measures to be taken by Member States in order to grant more protection to employees 
(article 4/2 CBMD)
125
. In what concerns creditors and minority shareholders the 
Member States should adopt rules that ensure their protection. The 14
th
 directive should 
develop a similar framework based on the dialectic between optional and mandatory 
standards, which are designed to guarantee that Member States ‘dance in the same 
rhythm’.  
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In a word, Member States should set forth their own mechanisms that should be in 
accordance with the Treaty, thus enabling freedom of establishment, meaning that 
Member States should not adopt too restrictive mechanisms that hinder corporate 
mobility, nor too permissive mechanisms that leave the stakeholders position 
unprotected. Member States legislations should find a balance between these two 
majors’ interests at stake: corporate mobility and stakeholders’ protection, which may 
lead to a ‘responsible corporate mobility’. Since «in medio stat virtus» and given that 
the middle ground is hard to find when multiple stimuli and pressures interact, the 14
th
 
directive should be the compass that guides Member States to a regulated environment, 
where in the end they will continue to be the responsible to legislate. 
As we said previously, the Parliament presented two resolutions, one in 2009 and the 
other in 2012, both containing annexes with detailed recommendations as to the content 
of the proposal requested such as the right to inform and consult employees’ 
representatives before the transfer’s decision and also the Member States’ possibility to 
ensure appropriate protection for minority shareholders who oppose the transfer, grating 
the right to retire from the company, in accordance with the legislation applicable in its 
home Member State. 
In sum the arena is ready for the adoption of the 14
th
 directive and the main issues to 
take into consideration have been addressed, so it is time for the Commission to act. The 
Commission should analyze the recommendations suggested by the Parliament and by 
scholars and finally present a consistent proposal of a directive. However, once the 
adoption of the 14
th
 directive may not happen as soon as desired due to the fact of being 
somehow trapped to the Regulation of the Societas Privata Europaea, it has been well 
considered by some Member States the analogical application of the CBMD regime to 
the direct reincorporations, as a solution to protect the stakeholders affected in the 
meanwhile and to combine the different legislations involved in the process
126




                                                          





“'Now to sum it up,' said Bernard. 'Now to explain 
to you the meaning of my life. Since we do not know 
each other (though I met you once I think, on board 
a ship going to Africa), we can talk freely.” 
 
Virginia Woolf, “The Waves” 
 
After having tried to respond the questions we proposed to answer in the beginning, 
namely “is it”, “why is it” and “how should it” it seems clear to us that there is an 
undeniable need of a discipline for direct reincorporations in the EU that should be 
fulfill through the adoption of the 14
th
 Directive on Cross-Border Transfer of 
Company’s Seat.  
We have confronted the two opposing EU’s conflict of laws and we have inferred 
that the ECJ through its case-law has been able to resolve the impasse between them, 
assuming that there is space for both theories in the EU as long as they comply with the 
Treaty. In the Court’s case law analysis we realized that “[a]fter its restrictive 
interpretation in Daily Mail the Court took a more liberal approach with regard to the 
freedom of establishment of companies”
127
. Unfortunately the Court’s case law has not 
been as consistent as desirable, but different political and economic contexts led to it. 
Notwithstanding of not agreeing with previous decisions, the Court has been unable to 
directly contradict them and therefore to clarify and deepen its understandings on 
several corporate mobility issues. Some authors have argued that “it is unlikely that the 
[ECJ] will develop the case law to its fullest logical conclusions […] as this could 
contradict case law that has been confirmed repeatedly by the Court”
128
.  
Nevertheless, the Court in a more or less objective way has been recognizing the 
rights’ existence thus paving the way for EU’s effective corporate mobility. Following, 
the Commission has given a hand on fleshing out and on harmonizing some issues such 
as those of indirect reincorporations, i.e. the SE Regulation and the CBMD. In what 
concerns direct reincorporations, following the Court’s recognition through Cartesio 
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and VALE cases, no legislative action has been taken yet to discipline the regulatory 
competition scenario it left uncovered.  
In sum, our final argument is that as a consequence of that EU’s current regulatory 
competition model that was mainly stimulated by the ECJ’s case law, Member States 
have the freedom to adopt their own unique direct reincorporations’ regime. This 
freedom to ‘draw’ so different paintings can be dangerous for the hardly achieved EU’s 
corporate mobility because it may create obstacles that will undermine its exercise. 
There is a need to discipline this Member States’ area of freedom, in order to guarantee 
a ‘healthy’ regulatory competition, where stakeholders are protected and the national 
rules are within the EU law limits. For that it is crystal clear the need of a specific  
directive, the long awaited 14
th
 directive (“Cross-border migration of company 
registration offices having been established as a principle, national laws have to be 
harmonized at short notice. This goal can and must be reached by passing, at long last, 
the 14
th
 EU Company Law Directive on cross-border company seat transfers”
129
).  
Finally, the chosen model for the 14
th
 directive should be inspired in the CBMD, 
once it has already obtained the difficult and necessary consensus and it has developed 
an adequate regime to guarantee the protection of the affected stakeholders. The 
analogical application of the CBMD regime that some Member States have considered 
as a solution to protect in the meanwhile the stakeholders affected confirms the 
unequivocal need of the 14
th
 directive and that the model should be inspired in the 
CBMD. The 14
th
 directive “may also, by the introduction into the law of Member States 
of a set of similar provisions, ensure that all national legal systems correspond to the 




Now that ‘we can talk freely’, it is time to pressure the Commission to have the 





 and to stop playing the ‘catch me if you can’ because it 
was already ‘caught’. It is time for Europe to have the courage to ‘talk freely’, to face its 
future with strength and hope and to finally build that kind of “United States of Europe” 
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